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proceeded.

As the three individuals reached an adult movie theatre,

located approximately 360 South State, they stopped and looked at
the suggestive advertising posters (T-7).

Officer Beesley pulled

along side of the curb adjacent to the individuals and stopped his
car.
During his shift, which began at 11:00 p.m. on the evening
of the 27th, Officer Beesley did not recall any reports of criminal
activity in the vicinity of Fourth South and State Street (T-17).
While watching the three individuals Officer Beesley did not observe
any violations of pedestrian-traffic ordinances of Salt Lake City.
Officer Beesley did not recall having had contact with any of the
three individuals prior to that night (T-22).
Officer Beesley made the decision to detain the three
individuals based on observations of them from his patrol car.
Those observations were as follows: Officer Beesley had observed
the individuals glancing into a store front window as they walked
slowly down the sidewalk, the three appeared nervous when they
realized they were being observed by a police officer (T-24).

After

noticing the presence of the patrol car, Joseph Trujillo moved a
small knapsack from his side to an area in front of him (T-9).
Officer Beesley described that motion as alternatively, casual, or
slow (T-21), hasty, or quick (T-22), and in between, casual and
quick (T-22).

Mr. Trujillo's bag was not visually concealed from

Officer Beesley as a result of its movement (T-21).

In addition to

his observations, Officer Beesley decided to detain the three
individuals based on his suspicions which were aroused by the early
hour—3:30 a.m. (T-25) and his conclusion that the location was a
high crime area.
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Officer Beesley drove to the corner of Fourth South and
State whereupon he existed his vehicle and approached the three
individuals from the south.

As Officer Beesley approached the three

individuals, he observed Mr. Trujillo put the knapsack down near a
garbage can at the corner of Fourth South and State (T. 9). Upon
reaching the three individuals Officer Beesley asked them what they
were doing in the area.

They responded that they were going to

Trujillo's cousin's place (T-ll).
asked them for identification.

Subsequently, Officer Beesley

Only one of the three could produce

an ID (T. 26). All three individuals, however, gave Officer Beesley
their names. During this interrogation, Officer Beesley observed
what he felt was a nervous reaction.

Based upon that nervousness,

Officer Beesley decided to perform a frisk search of Joseph Trujillo
(T-30, T-12).
Officer Beesley had not seen a weapon nor any portion of a
weapon on the person of any of the individuals (T. 30). Rather, his
decision to frisk was based on his "intuition" that someone might
have a gun (T.30).

During the frisk search of Joseph Trujillo,

Officer Beesley located an object he later identified as a knife
strapped to the midsection of Mr. Trujillo's chest (T.13).

At that

point, Mr. Trujillo was placed under arrest (T. 15).
It was later determined that Joseph Greg Trujillo was a
parolee from the Utah State Prison.

Joseph Greg Trujillo had been

granted parole on the 11th day of December, 1984, for the crime of
burglary, a second degree felony.

As a result of the incident of

February 28, 1985, Trujillo's parole was revoked.
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Defendant Trujillo filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the
weapon because the officer had no reason to stop the defenant and
could articulate no reasonable basis to justify the frisk.

(R. 14,

Addendum A).

After a hearing the motion was denied.

(R. 17/

Addendum B).

The matter was submitted to the trial judge on the

facts elucidated at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The
Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a term from Oto 5 years
in carceration in the Utah State Prison.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant first contents that the officer in this case
had no basis to stop him and his companions.

No report of criminal

activity had been made and the officer had had no previous contact
with the Appellant or his companions.

The stop was made on the

basis of a mere hunch which is impermissible.
Further the Appellant alleges that the officer had no basis
to conduct a pat down search.

The officer could articulate no

reasonable basis for such a search.

The results of the search

should have been suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL STOP OF DEFENDANT
VIOLATED HIS FOURTH AMENDEMENT
PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct.
1868 (1965), the United States Supreme Court created a limited
exception to the general probable cause requirement when it held
that under appropriate circumstances a brief detention of a person,
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absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.

See, also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L.Ed 2d

229 (1983).

The Terry Court instructs that this limited exception

is tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal
security.
In justifying a particular detention, an officer must be
able to point to specific articulable facts which, when viewed under
an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion that the
defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v.
Ohio, supra; Florida v. Royer, supra.

The Supreme Court in Terry

appropriately cautioned that:
Anything less would invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches, a result this Court has consistently
refused to sanction. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
The reasonable suspicion rationale of Terry has been codified in
Utah law at Section 77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953).
In the case at bar, Officer Beesley's detention of the
defendant, Joe Trujillo, constituted a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.

B

[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and

restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person."
Terry at 16.

In this case, the specific articulable facts relied on

by the officer in his decision to detain the defendant lend little
or no support to a finding of the required reasonable suspicion.
Essentially, the officer's testimony revealed reliance on six
factors to justify his detention of Mr. Trujillo.
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1.

The officer observed the defendant and two companions

walking slowly along the sidewalk at 3:40 a.m.
2.

As they strolled, the three men looked into store-front

30

Trujillo and his companions were walking at an early

4.

The officer observed the three in a "high crime area".

5.

An alleged movement of a bag held by the defendant was

windows

hour.

interpreted by the officer as being suspecious or furtive.
6.

The defendant allegedly reacted nervously to the

presence of the officer.
When the enumerated factors are analyzed in light of case
law from Utah, the United States Supreme Court, and other
jurisdictions, it becomes readily apparent that the officer was not
justified in detaining the defendant.
Factor I.

As noted above, the slow pace of the defendant

was one factor which led the officer to detain Trujillo.

However, a

slow rate of progress was given little or no weight in establishing
a reasonable suspicion by the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case
of State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (1986).

In that case, the officer

based a stop on the fact that a car with out-of-state license plates
was moving slowly through a residential area at 3:00 a.m.

The Court

held that the officer "had no objective facts on which to base a
reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in criminal
activity."

Jjd. at 30.

The specific circumstances surrounding this case do not
augment any suspicion of criminal activity.

The sidewalk was well

illuminated by street and business lighting (T-6).
- 6 -

None of the

officer's testimony gave any indication that Mr. Trujillo or his
companions attempted to hide or conceal themselves.

The officer did

not observe any violations of pedestrian-traffic ordinances (T-21).
If anything, a slow pace conveys an absence of apprehension or
hurriedness which may usually be attributed criminal conduct.
Many legitimate reasons exist for walking slowly such as: fatigue,
health ailments, lethargy, or a mere desire to relax.

The case law

cited indicates nothing inherently suspicious about the fact that
the Mr. Trujillo was proceeding slowly, and orderly, along the
public sidewalk.

Neither do the surrounding circumstances enhance a

suspicion of criminal activity.

Therefore, the officer may not rely

on this factor to justify his detention of Trujillo.
Factor II. Another factor relied on by the officer in his
attempt to justify the detention of the Defendant was the fact that
he observed the Defendant looking into store-front windows.
Addressing this issue in Terry, supra, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that "store windows . . . are made to be looked
in."

392 U.S. at 901. The language of the opinion and the context

within which it is found imply that viewing store windows is,
without more, irrelevant to the formation of a reasonable
suspicion.
The Court in Terry did, in fact, conclude that other
factors combined to justify detention.

There, the defendants had

displayed a long and repetitive pattern of behavior that was clearly
suspicious.
There is nothing unusual in two men standing
together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for
someone nor is there anything suspicious about
people in such circumstances strolling up and
- 7 -

down the street singly or in pairs. Store
windows, moreover are made to be looked in. The
story is quite different where, as here, the two
men hover about a street corner for an extended
period of time, at the end of which it becomes
apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or
anything; where these men pace alternately along
an identical route—pausing to stare in the same
window roughly 24 times; where each completion of
this route is followed immediately by a
conference between the two men on the corner.
Id. at 907.
In contrast, the case at bar involves no such pattern of
behavior.

The officer testified that the defendant made continuous

progress along the sidewalk and did not return to any store windows
they had already passed (T-20).

In fact, the officer testified he

concluded that Trujillo and his companion were looking into store
windows because they actually stopped in front of the adult theater
(T.6).

Mr. Trujillo's interest in "suggestive posters" (T-19) of an

adult movie theatre, if anything, vitiates suspicion of burglary or
other criminal activity.

This conduct is consistent with casual

activities of males of Mr. Trujillo's age group.

In short, casually

looking at adult movie posters and store windows while

progressing

down a sidewalk is not a specifically articulated fact which raises
a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed.
Factor III. The officer testified that his suspicion was
also aroused by the hour at which the defendant was observed (3:40
a.m.) (T-25).

Usually the streets of Salt Lake City are nearly

vacant at that time. However, like gait, time of day is generally
of little or no importance in justifying a detention.

Again, in

Carpena the defendants were stopped at about 3:00 A.M. but the Utah
Supreme Court refused to attach significance to the time of day.
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In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), two
individuals were detained while walking at the hour of 1:00 a.m.
The State, in that case, confessed error stating that the detention
was violative of the Fourth Amendment.

Although the Court did not

reach the merits of that case, it is apparent that the early hour
factor was not relied on as an articulable fact supporting
reasonable suspicion.
Addressing the "nighttime" factor, the California Supreme
Court has stated that it is of "minimal importance" at most and
"should be appraised with caution."

People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115,

119, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979) (citations omitted).

That court has

also recognized that:
[I]n our society it is not a crime for a citizen
to be out after dark [and] to permit an officer
to justify a search on the ground the he 'didn't
feel1 that a person on the street at night had
any lawful business there would expose anyone to
having his person searched by any suspicious
officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions
were. Innocent people, going to or from evening
jobs of entertainment, or walking for exercise or
enjoyment would suffer along with the occasional
criminal who would be turned in.'
People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449, 461, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970).
There are many lawful and legitimate reasons for citizens
to be about at night.

For example, the Defendant in the case at bar

testified that he was in the area of arrest in the early hours of
the morning because of his employment schedule with the Newspaper
Agency Corp. (T-32).

In this case, at least, the "nighttime" factor

should be considered of no value in determining whether the
officer's suspicion was reasonable.
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Factor IV,

The officer in this case also testified that he

became suspicious of criminal activity because he thought the area
in which he observed the defendant was a "high crime area."
Addressing this factor, the Supreme Court of California has
recognized that the "spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs
every day in so called high crime areas. As a result, this Court
has appraised this factor with caution and has been reluctant to
conclude that a location's crime rate transforms otherwise
innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the
seizure of an individual."
P.2d 115, 119 (1979).

People v. Bower, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 597

Thus, the California Court is careful to

apply close scrutiny to the "high crime area" factor.
approach makes sense.

Such an

The factor is not an "activity" of an

individual or the basis on which a detention should be justified,
but rather a social phenomena presumably unrelated to any particular
suspect.
The Utah Supreme Court has had little opportunity to fully
analyze the "high crime area" factor.

In Carpena, it was cited as

one factor upon which the officer based his suspicion.

Although the

per curiam opinion does not address the issue specifically, it must
be inferred that the high crime area factor was insufficient to
justify the challenged stop.

The Utah Court also saw this factor

arise in the case of State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (1980).

In

that case, the officer observed the defendants alone in an all-night
laundromat located in a high crime area at 1:00 a.m.

The officer

recognized the defendants from a recent previous criminal encounter
where he discovered, among other things, a bag of coins in their
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possession.

The Court held that the officer's suspicion of criminal

activity was reasonable and, therefore, the initial stop that led to
arrest was justified.
The circumstances surrounding the stop in Whittenback are
factually distinct from those in the case at bar.

The officer in

Whitenback had previously apprehended the same defendants in
possession of a bag of coins. That fact, when coupled with a rash
of burglaries in the area of the laundromat, could lead to a
reasonable suspicion that the defendants were committing a crime.
No such previous contacted existed in the case at bar.

The officer

testified that he did not recall seeing Trujillo or his companions
prior to the night in question (T-22).

Therefore, no link can be

forged between prior activities of the defendant and his presence in
a high crime area.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the officer's
designated high crime area (400 South State Street is within a one
block radius of many government centers:

City and County Bldg.,

Federal Court, District Court, Circuit Court).

Also of interest is

the fact that the officer did not recall any reports of crime
occurring at that location during his shift (T-24).
The case law counsels extreme caution in relying on the
bare assertion that an area is frought with high crime, in
justifying a stop and detention.

Without more, the general social

phenomenon of a high crime area does not constitute a specific
articulable fact which creates a reasonable suspicion of criminality.
Factor V.

The officer's subjective interpretation of a

certain movement by the defendant was cited as an important factor
leading to the decision to detain.

The alleged "furtive" or
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suspicious movement was nothing more than the defendant shifting the
position of his knapsack from his side to a position in front of him.
The officer's inconsistent testimony concerning the
movement itself illustrates the uncertainty and subjectivity of the
observation.

The officer first testified the movement was "casual"

or slow. (T-24).
(T-22).

Later he described the action as "hasty" or quick

When confronted with this inconsistency the officer

testified that the movement was in between casual and quick.

The

officer testified that he subjectively believed the movement was
intended to conceal the bag.

However, the officer could not testify

that the bag was hidden from his view.

(T-21).

The ordinary nature

of the movement coupled with the vagueness of, and inconsistencies
within, the officer's testimony raise crictical issues regarding the
reliability of the use of this factor in support of the
establishment of a reasonable suspicion.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of furtive movements, the question has been the focus of significant
decisions by the Supreme Court of California.

In People v. Bower,

the California Court recognized the inherent problems in attempting
to infer criminal intent from a furtive movement when it stated that:
The difficulty is that from the view point of the
observer, an innocent gesture can often be
mistaken for a guilty movement. He must not only
perceive the gesture accurately, he must also
interpret it in accordance with the actor's true
intent. But if words are not infrequently
ambiguous, gestures are even more so. Many are
wholly nonspecific, and can be assigned a meaning
only in their context. Yet the observer may view
that context quite otherwise from the actor: not
only is his vantage point different, he may even
have approached the scene with a preconceived
notion-consciously or subconsciously-of what
gestures he expected to see and what he expected
them to mean. The potential for misunderstanding
in such a situation is obvious.
- 12 -

597 P.2d 115, 120-121 (Ca. 1979) (guotineg People v. Superior Court
of Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (Ca. 1970) (emphasis in original)).
The California high court correctly recognized that the
reasons for movements interpreted by an officer as furtive may run
the spectrum from wholly legitimate to completely criminal. Because
of the great possibility of misinterpretation, courts, as well as
peace officers, must necessarily be exceedingly cautious when basing
suspicion on gestures of citizens.
The case at bar presents a situation wherein the
possibility for misinterpretation by the officer was extremely
great.

There is nothing objectively suspicious about a "casual"

shift of a bag from one position to another on one's arm.

Such

movements are the result of wholly legitimate purposes countless
times every day.

For a gesture to be considered an indication of

criminal intent, it must be unambiguously suspicious. Otherwise,
ordinary gestures observed in daily life, such as the gesture
involved in the case at bar, would justify police detainment and
questioning of law-abiding citizens.

Such a result would be a

negative affront to the liberated society within which we live.
Factor VI. Additionally, the officer testified that his
suspicion was aroused because he believed the defendant acted
nervously upon realizing that he was being observed.

This alleged

nervousness should not be miscontrued to include any reaction which
occured after Mr. Trujillo's detention.
Nervous reaction is merely another forum of furtive
movement and is subject to the same interperative difficulties
discussed above.

Indeed, a "nervous reaction" is even more
- 13 -

undefinable and more subject to misinterpretation than is a more
objectively veritable action such as bodily movements.
the present case illustrate that point.

The facts of

The officer was unable to

point to specific and articulable facts that supported his
conclusion that the defendant acted nervously prior to the resulting
detention.

The following exchange occurred during cross-examination

of the officer concerning the reason for stopping Mr. Trujillo and
his companions:
Q.

What was your reason for approaching them?

A.

Their conduct, the time.

Q.

When you say conduct, explain.

A.

Suspicious conduct.

Q.

Suspicious in what way?

A.

As I looked back at them they appeared nervous.
They appeared shaken that I was there.

(T. 23-24)

The nervousness that the officer allegedly perceived but

could not articulate in objective terms, is auguably the reaction of
the majority of persons who come into contact with police.

Such

vague, subjective, instinctual hunches cannot form the foundation of
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
Assuming arguendo that the gestures and reactions of the
defendant were objectively suspicious, the officer failed to address
the issue properly prior to detainment and general questioning.

The

California Supreme Court, in Gallick v. Superior Court of Santa
Clara County, has indicated that the reasonable course of action for
an officer to pursue upon interpreting a movement to be suspicious
is to question the citizen about the gesture itself.
576 (1971).

489 P.2d 573,

Although the citizen would not be obligated to respond,
. 14 -

the officer may receive a perfectly legitimate explanation of the
gesture and have his suspicion allayed.

I_d. 576-77.

Such a course

of action would clearly be preferable to that pursued in the case at
bar where the officer's preconceived notion of the intent behind the
defendant's demeanor became an important factor leading to an
unreasonable search and seizure.
The six factors discussed above, when viewed singly, in the
context of the circumstances surrounding the case at bar do not
constitute specific articulable facts which create a reasonable
suspicion that a crime was being or had been committed by Mr.
Trujillo.

Furthermore, nothing concerning the combination or

accumulation of those factors renders them more persuasive or
pertinent in support of a conclusion that the officer's suspicion
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

"The underlying facts

fail to reasonably distinguish [the suspected individual] from any
other citizen" at the time and place of the detention.

People v.

Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 118 (Ca. 1979) (citation ommitted).
A citizen, presumably having lawful motives, is not
inherently suspicious when walking along a public sidewalk looking
in store front windows in the early hours of the morning.

Mere

subjective hunches afford no constitutionally permissible grounds
upon which to predicate a finding of reasonable suspicion and
because the defendant in no objectively articulable way appeared
suspicious, the State has failed to satisfy its burden of justifying
the detention and the evidence seized pursuant thereto should,
therefore, have been suppressed.
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POINT II.
THE FRISK OF DEFENDANT'S PERSON WAS AN
UNREASONABLE SEARCH, EVIDENCE SEIZED THEREIN SHOULD
THEREFORE BE SUPPRESSED.

[The makers of our constitution] conferred, as
against the government the right to be left
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Olmstead v.
The United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478; 48 S.Ct.
564, 572; 72 L.Ed. 944, 956 (1928).
The right to be let alone is, of course, not inviolate.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unwarranted intrusions into
the privacy of an individual with a very few specifically
established and jealously drawn exceptions.

The facts of the case

at bar bring into issue the Terry frisk exception.

Under Terry v.

Ohio, supra, police officers were given a "narrowly drawn authority
to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.11 rd. at 27.
Even though a Terry frisk is not dependent on the existence of
probable cause necessary for an arrest, the initial detention of the
individual to be searched must be justified by specific articulable
facts creating a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is
being committed. (See discussion in Point 1).
In Terry v. Ohio the Court attempted to reach a balance
between the governmental interest of investigating crime including
the neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative
- 16 -

circumstance and the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches or seizures.

The Court attempted to achieve this balance

by limiting the type of search which could be performed.

In that

case the Court allowed the frisk of the defendant where the frisk or
pat down consisted of patting down the outer clothing without
placing hands in pockets or under the outer surface of clothing
until a weapon was felt. While authorizing such a search the Court
stated "even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon the cherished
personal security." Terry at 25.
In addition to restricting the physical scope of the search
the Court in Terry also restricted the purpose of the search.

"The

sole justification of the search in the present situation is the
protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the
assault of the police officer."

Terry at 29. The Terry Court

specifically recognized that a frisk or pat down could not be used
to preserve evidence which was in danger of being destroyed.
In Terry, the Court adopted the "reasonable belief"
standard.

This standard, which has been codified in Utah Law at §-

77-7-16 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), has been explained in this
way:
The officer need not be absolutely certain that
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger. Further, it is not
essential that an officer actually have been in
fear. United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098,
1101 (5th Cir. 1976).
- 17 -

The officer must, however, have some reasonable basis for stopping
and frisking. "Due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch1, but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience."

Terry at 31.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656
(Utah 1985) has construed this standard to mean that the officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the intrusion. Jj3. at 659.

In State v. Roybal, (716 P.2d

291 (1986)), the Utah Court adopted the position taken by the United
States Supreme Court in Terry stating that reasonable inferences
drawn from those articulable facts derive from the experience of the
police officer.
The test enunciated in Terry concerning the validity of a
Terry frisk cannot be rigidly applied nor is it susceptible to
mathematical or quantifiable exactitude.

"No single factor is

determitive of reasonableness, a trial judge must determine
reasonableness in light of all the facts."

State v. Houser, Utah,

669 P.2d 437, 439 (1983) and State v. Carter, supra at 659. It
remains only to analyze the specific facts of the present case.
Although each case must be analyzed in light of its own particular
combination of facts and circumstances, it is helpful to examine
other Utah cases where the reasonable belief standard has been
applied.

The Utah Court in State v. Carter, supra and in State v.

Roybal supra determined that the specific and articulable facts and
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the reasonable inferences drawn thereon in light of the arresting
officer's experience reached the threshold level and vindicated the
Terry frisks which were performed in each of those cases.
In State v. Carter, Officer Winkler of the Salt Lake City
Police Department stopped and frisked Tommy Lynn Carter.

Officer

Winkler's reliance on the six specific factors, enumerated by the
Court, justified his reasonable suspicion that Carter may have been
armed and dangerous.
1.

The individual stopped by Officer Winkler matched a

radioed dispatch description of a burglary suspect as a black male
with a blue backpack.
2.

The Court in Carter adopted the position that it is

reasonable for an officer to infer that a burglary suspect may be
armed with weapons or tools which could be used as weapons.
3.

Officer Winkler had located the defendant less than a

block away from the burglary scene approximately one-half hour after
the radioed dispatch.
4.

The defendant had a large bulge in his front pocket.

5.

Winkler had previously arrested a female who implicated

an individual with greasy hair and crooked front teeth named Tommy
Carter in criminal activity.

The individual stopped by Officer

Winkler matched the description and identified himself as Tommy
Carter.
6.

The officer and the suspect were in a dark alley.

In constrast to the Carter case, Officer Beesley in the
case at bar, had not received a radioed dispatch describing either
Trujillo or his companions.

Additionally, Officer Beesley could not
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recall any reports of criminal activity in the general location
where he located Trujillo during his entire shift.

Officer Beesley

also testified that he saw no bulges in Trujillo's clothing nor had
he seen any portion of the knife which was found.

Interestingly,

Beesley could not recall having contact with Trujillo prior to his
stop.

Officer Beesley effectuated his stop in a well-lighted area.

Also, Officer Beesley had no reason to believe that Trujillo was a
burglary suspect.

Therefore, none of the factors relied on by the

Court exist in the case at bar.

In fact, the facts and

circumstances in the case at bar are nearly opposite from those in
the Carter case.
In State v. Roybal, Deputy Mitchell proceeded to an address
in response to a complaint phoned in by an individual named Orlando
Roybal.

716 P.2d at 292. Roybal represented that he was calling

from a phone booth two blocks away from the address. After
responding to the address Officer Mitchell encountered and frisked
Orlando Roybal. In determining that Officer Mitchell had an
articulable basis for his reasonable belief that Orlando Roybal was
armed and dangerous, the Court relied on seven specific factors:
1.

There was no one at the phone booth where the call

reportedly originated.
2.

There was no suspicious vehicle in the vicinity as the

complaint had indicated.
3.

There had been a shooting incident at that address

earlier in the morning.
4.

Orlando Roybal had been arrested in conjunction with

the earlier shooting incident and was reported to still be in
custody.
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5.

The gun used in the previous incident had not been

recovered when the defendant was arrested.
6.

Orlando Roybal approached the officer and identified

himself by name.
7.

The defendant leaned on the car as if he was trying to

conceal something behind his back.

716 P.2d at 293.

Without belaboring the point, it is clear that the facts in
the case at bar are inapposite to those contained in Roybal.

Again,

in the present case, no prior incident or contact with Mr. Trujillo
had occured prior to the encounter with Officer Beesley at 3:30 a.m.
on February 28, 1986 and Trujillo was completely unknown to Officer
Beesley.
The Roybal and Carter cases differ drastically from the
case at bar, not only in their factual circumstances, but also in
the nature of those facts.

Whereas in Roybal and Carter specific

articulable facts existed which justified the officers1 reasonable
belief that the individuals were armed; in the present case, Officer
Beesley attempted to justify the frisk performed on Mr. Trujillo
solely on the basis of the nervousness which he observed.
Nervousness in and of itself does not constitute an objective
articulable basis on which the officer could have made the decision
to frisk Mr. Trujillo.

Rather, nervousness falls into the category

of a mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch which is not
sufficient.

Terry and State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (1985).

In fact, Officer Beesley freely admitted that his feeling or belief
that Trujillo had a weapon was intuition.
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(T-30).

The intuition

relied on by Officer Beesley is a concrete example of the hunch or
unfounded suspicion which the United States Supreme Court prohibited
in Terry as did the Utah Supreme Court in Swanigan and Carpena.
Officer Beesley stated that because of Trujillo's
nervousness he didn't know whether someone had a gun in their coat,
and feared that if he turned his back he might be shot.

(T-12).

The unfounded suspicion which he makes reference to is conceivably
present in every contact Officer Beesley has with members of the
general public.

The suspicion however does not justify frisking

every individual and thereby invading individual privacy.

It is

therefore clear that the facts relied on by Officer Beesley are of a
different nature than those relied upon by other officers in
previous cases. These "facts" did not justify the invasion of Mr.
Trujillo's person and privacy nor can Officer Beesley rely on his
experience as a police officer in extrapolating inferences from the
nervousness he observed.

No where in the record did Officer Beesley

state his years of experience as police officer.

The only statement

he made is that he had worked in downtown Salt Lake for a couple of
years as a police officer. (T-7).

In contrast, the officer making

the stop and frisk in Terry v. Ohio relied on over 35 years of
experience to justify the reasonable inferences he drew.
The State has not met its burden of showing that objective
and specific articulable facts existed to justify Officer Beesley's
Terry frisk of Joe Trujillo.

Nothing concerning the facts

surrounding the incident that occured on February 28, 1986, nor the
past experience of Officer Beesley changed the character of Officer
Beesley's reliance.

Officer Beesley's personal admission that he
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relied on the impermissible basis of intuition or hunch is clear
evidence of the unreasonable nature of the search performed.

The

State failed to adduce any specific or objective articulable facts
which would support a reasonable belief that Mr. Trujillo had a
weapon in his possession.

Therefore, pursuant to constitutional law

as stated in Terry v. Ohio and Utah statutory law, the search
performed was an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.

Based on those facts, defendant requests that evidence

seized as a result of the illegal search be suppressed and that his
conviction be overturned.
CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Joseph Trujillo, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and
remand his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the
charges, or a new trial.
ill1*-
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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JOSEPH GREG TRUJILLO,
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through his counsel of record, Kendall S. Peterson, and hereby
moves that the Court suppress all evidence obtained on or about
February 28, 1986 when Mr. Trujillo was arrested by Officers'
Beesley and McDonald of the Salt Lake Citv Police Department.
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stop and detention of the defendant as well as the frisk-search
performed.

Defendant alleges that the Officer's actions were in
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah
as contained in §77-7-15 and §77-7-16 Utah Code Annotated.
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